

# SÜDOSTEUROPA

## Mitteilungen

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the New Eurozone Policies

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Croatia's Accession to the EU:  
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**Schwerpunkt Ungarn**

**Beiträge von**

*Joachim von Puttkamer / Ellen Bos  
András Hettyey / László Csaba  
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## Sehr geehrte Leserin, sehr geehrter Leser,

das Schwerpunktthema „Die Urteile des ICTY zu Gotovina und Haradinaj und die Folgen“ im letzten Heft 02/2013 unserer Zeitschrift erregte einige Aufmerksamkeit: Die FAZ berichtete ausführlich. Heftig war der Sturm der Entrüstung, der auf unseren Autor Fatos Lubonja für seinen Beitrag „The Acquittal of Ramush Haradinaj and Its Perception in the Albanosphere“ niederging. Im Kosovo wurde eine intensive Debatte über den Beitrag eröffnet. Dazu Lubonja in einer E-Mail an die SOM-Redaktion: „Die Reaktionen im Kosovo übertrafen meine Erwartungen – im schlechten wie im guten Sinn. Es ist klar, dass das Thema von brennender Aktualität ist – aus vielerlei Gründen, die ich in meinem Artikel erläutert habe. Ich habe erwartet, in den sozialen Netzwerken als Verräter beschuldigt zu werden, als jemand, der von den Serben bezahlt wird, ja sogar, Todesdrohungen auf meiner facebook-Seite zu erhalten. Nicht erwartet habe ich die Reaktionen von Seiten öffentlicher Personen.“ Der Sprecher von Haradinajs Partei hatte Lubonja mit schlimmsten Schimpfworten titulierte. Dieselbe Person setzte Lubonja an die dritte Stelle in einer Liste der „Feinde der Albaner im Kosovo“ – hinter die serbischen Politiker Slobodan Milošević und Dobrica Ćosić. Lubonja weiter: „Auf der anderen Seite glaube ich, etwas Gutes bewegt zu haben. Eine kleine, aber mutige Gruppe von Journalisten im Kosovo hat mich verteidigt und zugleich gefordert, dass im Kosovo eine Debatte über Kriegsverbrechen eröffnet wird. Ein Tabu scheint gebrochen worden zu sein.“ Lubonja nennt stellvertretend Arben Idrizi und Halil Matoshi, die in diesem Sinn ihre Stimme gegen den nationalistischen Mainstream erhoben haben. Ihnen gilt unser Respekt für den bewiesenen Mut – ebenso wie dem Autor Fatos Lubonja selbst.

Unser gewichtiges Doppelheft 03/04 2013 beginnt mit aktuellen Beiträgen über die Euro-Krisenstaaten **Griechenland** und Republik **Zypern**. Wer über Zypern von „Krise“ sprach, meinte bis vor kurzem den Antagonismus zwischen griechischen und türkischen Zyprioten. Heute verstehen wir darunter eher den beispiellosen wirtschaftlichen Absturz eines Staates vom „Musterland“ zum Sanierungsfall, dessen Dimensionen und Ursachen unsere Experten auf den Grund gehen.

Für fast alle Beobachter überraschend kam in **Albanien** der klare Wahlsieg der Sozialistischen Partei bei den Parlamentswahlen im Juni 2013. Unsere AutorInnen fragen, ob wir in Albanien Zeugen einer echten politischen Erneuerung werden, ob Albanien den politischen Reifetest bestanden hat. Einen entscheidenden An Schub für die notwendigen strukturellen Reformen, so die beiden Beiträge unisono, brächte eine rasche Eröffnung von Beitrittsverhandlungen durch die EU.

Als wenig stabil hat sich die neue Regierung in **Bulgarien** nach den vorzeitigen Neuwahlen im Mai 2013 erwiesen, das zeigen nicht zuletzt die anhaltenden Straßenproteste. Die Diagnose

des Konsolidierungsgrades der bulgarischen Demokratie fällt bei den Autoren zweier Analysen zu Bulgarien durchaus unterschiedlich aus – lassen Sie sich als Leser überraschen.

Viel geschrieben wurde über den EU-Beitritt von Kroatien, das zum 1. Juli 2013 als 28. Mitgliedstaat in die EU aufgenommen wurde. Wenig Beachtung fanden dabei die durchaus gravierenden wirtschaftlichen Auswirkungen dieses Beitritts für den Nachbarstaat **Bosnien und Herzegowina**, mit denen sich ein weiterer Beitrag in diesem Heft auseinandersetzt.

Befindet sich Ungarn unter der Regierung von Viktor Orbán und seiner FIDESZ-Partei auf dem Weg zu einem autokratischen Regime oder sind die u.a. seitens westlicher Medien angeprangerten demokratischen Defizite Ausdruck von Unkenntnis und Hypokrisie? Ist Ungarn in Wirklichkeit ein „ganz normales Land“? Ein differenziertes Bild des modernen Ungarn zeichnet – im Rahmen einer breitangelegten Betrachtung – unser **Ungarn-Schwerpunkt**, bei dem sechs erstklassige Experten (Historiker, Politologen, Juristen und Ökonomen) zu Wort kommen. Die meisten Beiträge sind Ergebnisse einer Ungarn-Tagung am 26. April 2013 in Regensburg, veranstaltet von der Südosteuropa-Gesellschaft gemeinsam mit den einschlägigen, in Regensburg ansässigen Institutionen am dortigen Institut für Ost- und Südosteuropaforschung. Näheres über diese Konferenz können Sie im Berichtsteil dieses Heftes nachlesen.

Eine aufschlussreiche Lektüre wünscht Ihnen

Ihre Redaktion

*Hansjörg Brey*

*Claudia Hopf*

# SÜDOSTEUROPA

## Mitteilungen

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**George Tzogopoulos**

### **Is a Greek Success Story Possible?**

The 'success story' frame – also in times of deep economic crisis – is often publicly used by the Greek administration in its effort to mediate its alleged success to fulfil international commitments and apply the bailout terms. But does this notion reflect the reality?

This article will attempt to elaborate on this question. Although it will show that Greece has managed to relatively reduce its budget and current account deficits and increase its competitiveness, it will mainly concentrate on the principal reasons why recovery seems a utopia. The continuing incompetence of Greek political elites to implement structural reforms, their populist rhetoric, their credibility deficit, their emphasis on political and personal goals – instead of national ones –, and their failure to inform public opinion on the lack of viable alternatives are considered as the dominant aspects challenging the 'success story' frame.

**Zenon Pophaides**

### **The Cypriot Crisis and the New Eurozone Policies**

The crisis in the Republic of Cyprus is mainly a banking crisis. For a number of years the banks enjoyed the benefits of foreign capital inflows, which allowed them to expand considerably abroad (mainly in Greece) and of course locally. The banks suffered enormous losses as a direct result of the haircut of the Greek sovereign debt and the deteriorating quality of their loan portfolio both in Greece and Cyprus, following the global economic crisis. The size of the financial sector relative to the country's national income was such that the state was not in a position to bail it out. The widely held view that Cyprus acted as a financial centre for money-laundering of illicit Russian funds is an exaggeration at best and is contrary to historical facts and reports produced by competent international organisations. While cases of money laundering did take place and current practices in this regard certainly should be improved, the financial sector in general operated in a legitimate manner.

**Heinz-Jürgen Axt**

### **The Republic of Cyprus as a Bankruptcy Case: Legends and Facts Concerning the Financial Crisis**

In March 2013 the partners of the Eurozone and the International Monetary Fund agreed to provide a financial aid package of 10 bn. Euro to the Republic of Cyprus. It

took more than one year for the partners to agree on the conditions. That Cyprus asked for external assistance has frequently been explained by the Greek haircut in February 2012. But the financial crisis in Cyprus is “homemade” to a greater extent. There are at least eight factors which culminated in the financial crash: Firstly, the financial sector in Cyprus has grown excessively. Secondly, control of the financial industry by the national government and Central Bank proved to be insufficient. Thirdly, the control of the offshore sector has been unsatisfactory as well, as the European Commission noted already when Cyprus entered the European Union in 2004. Fourthly, the Euro partners realized some of the undesirable developments, but reacted too late. Fifthly, the haircut in Greece indeed was not the only reason for the outbreak of the crisis, but it acted clearly as a catalyst. Sixthly, the Republic of Cyprus was characterized as an economic miracle in the past. In the last decade, however, international competitiveness declined. Seventhly, Cyprus kept its public debt under control as long as it had to qualify for the entry to the European Monetary Union. After 2008, however, debt increased beyond the permitted maximum. Eighthly, President Christophias shied away from confronting the trade unions in order to carry out structural reforms which were needed urgently. As it is the case in other peripheral countries, too, Cyprus is hit by three parameters: deficit and debt are too high, international competitiveness is too low and the state is overstressed when it comes to recapitalizing the banks.

**Michael Weichert**

**Parliamentary Elections in Albania on 23 June 2013  
Rotation of Power or Renaissance of Politics?**

The parliamentary elections in Albania on 23 June 2013 ended with a landslide victory of the opposition coalition under the leadership of Edi Rama, the president of the Socialist Party –constituting a “referendum” given the ballot against a third government of Sali Berisha. The result came as a surprise to nearly everybody: Sali Berisha did not expect to loose the elections at all; Edi Rama did not expect to win so easily, and many international observers expected a rather close result. The article provides an analysis of the results and comes to the conclusion that the only difference to the previous Albanian elections lies in the number of votes between the two political blocks. While many observers do give the elections a positive assessment, the paper argues that the challenges of the “logic of clientelism” in Albania still prevail, also, in and after these elections. The crucial question whether the election results actually represent just another rotation of power or rather a “renaissance and a renewal” of politics in Albania – as promised by the opposition – can only be answered after the new government is given the chance to proof its willingness and capability to overcome a nearly systemic clientelism which is wide-spread in all spheres of public and private life. Edi Rama has shown in his first period as mayor of Tirana that he is capable of positive surprises, which should be considered as a chance and as a hope. However, despite all reasons for optimism, without strong international support the government will not be in the position to confront successfully the serious economic and social challenges prevailing in Albania. To open the EU accession process as soon as possible can serve as a path-maker for the new government and the urgently needed reforms in Albania.



**Johanna Deimel / Antoinette Primatarova**  
**Albania before and after the Parliamentary Elections 2013**  
**Democratic Test of Maturity Passed?**

The paper discusses Albania's progress towards a stable and vibrant democracy against the background of the recent elections on 23 June 2013, both on their eve and in their wake. The landslide victory of the Socialist Party (SP) lead coalition of Edi Rama over the Democratic Party (DP) lead coalition of incumbent Prime Minister Sali Berisha was generally perceived as good news.

The authors are taking a closer look on issues that can help turning the anticipated positive changes into reality; they also pay attention to developments in Albania today that might keep the further progress of the country hostage of the past. Citizens are more and more changing into *citoyens* and civil society in Albania is getting stronger and more self-confident whereas the dialogue and consensus willingness of the Albanian politicians remain still limited.

In this context, the paper is arguing that granting Albania the EU candidate status and hopefully starting EU accession negotiations as soon as possible are the appropriate ways to use citizens' and civil society's energy for the sake of a democracy meeting European standards and values in the future.

**Tim Graewert**  
**Bulgaria after the New Elections on 12 May 2013**  
**The Political Elite in Legitimacy Crisis**

On 12 May 2013 early elections were held in Bulgaria, after the former government of ex-Prime Minister Bojko Borisov stepped down in February as a reaction to mass protests throughout the country. The low voter turnout of 51 % and opinion polls indicate the discontent of the Bulgarian population with their political elite. Politicians are widely perceived as being corrupt, and previous governments have not succeeded in remarkably improving the standard of living in the poorest EU-member country.

The new coalition government of the Bulgarian Socialists and the Movement for Rights and Freedoms (the party of the Turkish minority) does not have a majority of its own in the national parliament and currently depends on the support of the nationalist party Ataka.

After the newly elected government nominated a media magnate as security chief of the country, mass protests against the government were triggered. Since June 2013 anti-government protests have been taken place on a daily basis in the Bulgarian capital Sofia.

**Michael Hein**  
**Constitution and Democratic Consolidation in Post-socialist**  
**Bulgaria**  
**A Formal Institution as Decisive Factor in the Southeast European Context?**

The article examines the factors influencing the consolidation of the post-socialist democracy in Bulgaria. It argues for a thin concept of consolidation that declares a

democratic governmental system consolidated if it has achieved a certain degree of democracy, and opposes thick concepts that (de facto) understand consolidation as a never-ending process.

On this basis, the analysis shows that in the Bulgarian case only one of ten consolidation factors had an unrestricted positive effect. Surprisingly, this was the constitution, although formal institutions are widely perceived to be little effective in Southeastern Europe. The article concludes that even the governmental crisis of 2013 confirms the assessment of the Bulgarian democracy as consolidated, because the crisis did not imperil the institutional order like in the similar case of Romania.

**Mijo Božić / Matej Živković**

### **Implications for Trade Relations between the Republic of Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina subsequent to Croatia's Accession to the European Union**

The Croatian accession to the EU on 1 July 2013 affects Bosnia and Herzegovina as its most important trading partner. The two countries have a very rich mutual trade exchange constituted in the Central European Free Trade Agreement (CEFTA). CEFTA was created as trading bloc to serve as a base point in the path of Eastern European countries in their European integration. For most of them it has served the purpose.

Croatia's accession to the EU will at the same time legally mean its exit from CEFTA, entailing all subsequent consequences. The structure of trade will submit to a new legal regime presenting two countries with significant difficulties to continue trading as they did under CEFTA. The two countries Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina will face threats but also opportunities to use this new situation to their own benefit.

## ***Main Focus: Hungary***

**Joachim von Puttkamer**

### **Hungary since 1989: A Change of System and Its Weak Points**

The paper explores the Hungarian system change in 1989. Contrasting the events with Poland, it seeks to find elements of the present political cleavages in a lack of symbolical power. Of equal importance is the fact that during the negotiations at the Round Table, the Hungarian communist party had already surrendered its power, so that the cleavages between the opposition parties already became visible.

During the following elections, the voters experienced democracy as a power struggle among competing democratic parties, rather than as the downfall of communism. The leftist-liberal coalition in 1994 reshaped the political landscape and cemented the cleavages which haunt the Hungarian political system until the present day.

**Ellen Bos**

## **Hungarian Democracy in Crisis?**

### **Changes of the Political System in Hungary after Three Years Government of Viktor Orbán**

Since the landslide victory of FIDESZ/KDNP in the 2010 elections the government of Viktor Orbán commands a two-thirds-majority in the Hungarian Parliament, which pushed through large-scale changes of the Hungarian political system. These political reforms, especially the new constitution of April 2011 and the new electoral law of December 2011, have given rise to controversial debates on the quality of democracy in Hungary both in Hungary as well as in its European partner countries. Whereas Viktor Orbán justifies the reforms as a necessary completion of the transition to democracy, his opponents criticize them as steps towards an autocratic regime.

The article gives first a short overview on the political developments in Hungary from the radical system change in 1989/90 up to the elections of 2010. Afterwards it analyzes the reconstruction of the political system under the Orbán government and discusses the state of democracy after three years of FIDESZ government. It shows that although the political reforms weaken the veto players in the democratic system of Hungary, they do not abolish the separation of powers or the rule of law.

**András Hettyey**

## **The European Policy of the Orbán Government**

The paper analyses the European policy pursued by the government of Prime Minister Viktor Orbán. Having won a two-thirds majority in the 2010 elections, the new Orbán government went on to make its mark in the European Union. This was all the easier as, in the first half of 2011, Hungary held the rotating presidency of the European Union. Hungary conducted a fairly successful presidency, but the whole affair was overshadowed by the disputes on the Hungarian media law and the new Constitution.

After the EU presidency the government mostly focused on the negotiations about the EU budget for 2014-2020 and the continuation of the enlargement policy – with some success.

The third part of the article focuses on Viktor Orbán's perception of the EU in the light of his public speeches and interviews, and shows that there are at least three different discourses which the Hungarian Prime Minister applies in regard to the EU.

**László Csaba**

## **Growth, Crisis Management and the EU: The Hungarian Trilemma**

The paper addresses the challenges of the Hungarian economic strategy in the post-2010 period. It analyzes the constraints and options, as well as the reaction and interaction of various players on the international arena that have shaped outcomes. Beyond the discussion of the 15 months of futile negotiations with the IMF, issues of how Hungary fits, with its unorthodox economic policies, in the changing architecture of the European Union moving towards ever more federalism in its crisis management.

**Krisztina Nagy**

## **Current Questions of Freedom of the Media in Hungary**

Media relations in Hungary have been defined by the lack of substantive changes in the legal framework, the realignment of media market conditions and the low-key sanctioning of the media authority between mid 2011 to the end of 2012, as the analyses of MerteK Media Monitor show. The analysis of the NGO, which examines the impact of the Hungarian new media regulations, provides a comprehensive overview on the changes of the media market and the content supply, the enforcement activities of the media authority, the press freedom and the public function.

The article assesses changes in the regulatory environment, particularly in the context of those objections formulated by various international organizations and analyses the frequency allocation practices and content control activity of the media authority.

**Krisztián Ungváry**

## **Hungary: The Culture of Remembrance and Political Conflicts**

The culture of remembrance pursued by the state has always mirrored the concepts of democracy and law of those in power. It also reflects the political structure in the respective countries. For three years Hungary has been led by a government that describes itself as anti-communist and centre right, despising its predecessors as post-communists. A closer analysis shows in how far this definition is justified. It should be noted that the culture of remembrance in Hungary differs strongly from those in West European countries regardless of the single parliamentary terms. The differences might be explained by the particular Hungarian past and the relatively short period of political freedom since 1990.

One special feature of the policy of remembrance pursued by the FIDESZ party in Hungary is that it is indistinguishable in its contents from the cultural program of the neo-national socialist Jobbik party. In order to conceal those very problematic contents FIDESZ performs a double culture of remembrance with a double media landscape: Both the moderate as well as the radical national socialist voter will be satisfied with the offers that are directed centrally by the government. It would be wrong to suppose that FIDESZ offers its cultural program to its biggest competitor (Jobbik) because it intends a coalition government with this party. On the contrary: The policy of remembrance in Hungary also serves to bind the electorate of the other parties.